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NOTES 
 
Congress’ Preliminary Response to the 
Abu Ghraib Prison Abuses 
ROOM FOR REFORM? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 22, 2004, Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) 
introduced a bill in response to the prisoner abuses 
photographed at the Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq.1  
Divided into three parts, the bill directs the President to 
require: (1) the videotaping of interrogations and “other 
pertinent interactions” of detainees in the custody of the 
United States armed forces as well as intelligence operatives 
and contractors of the United States;2 (2) “unfettered access” to 
detainees in the custody of the United States by members of 
various international human rights organizations;3 and (3) the 
developing of guidelines by the Judge Advocate General to 
ensure that the required videotaping in “section 1 is 
  
 1 H.R. 4951, 108th Cong. (2d Sess. 2004) [hereinafter Interrogation Bill].  
Representative Holt reintroduced the Interrogation Bill to Congress on January 4, 
2005, stating that “Congress failed to do [its] job, doggedly investigate how and why 
[the Abu Ghraib prison] abuses occurred, and put in place new safeguards for 
interrogations in U.S. military detention facilities . . . .”  151 CONG. REC. E15 (daily ed. 
Jan. 4, 2005) (statement of Rep. Holt). 
 2 Specifically, the bill orders the President to act “[i]n accordance with the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment” and “the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States” when implementing a specific videotaping plan.  
Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 1(a).  In addition, the bill also requires that 
“[v]ideotapes shall be made available . . . to both prosecution and defense to the extent 
they are material to any military or civilian criminal proceeding.”  Id. § 1(b). 
 3 The human rights organizations mentioned in the bill are The 
International Federation of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent, The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and The United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture.  Id. § 2. 
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sufficiently expansive to prevent any abuse of detainees” that 
violates “law binding on the United States, including 
[international] treaties . . . .”4 
Three formal reports evaluate the allegations of abuse 
at Abu Ghraib.5  The Taguba Report, commissioned by the 
United States Army and written by Major General Antonio 
Taguba, has been available to the public since May 2, 2004, 
despite the fact that it was initially marked SECRET/NO 
FOREIGN DISSEMINATION.6  The Schlesinger Report, 
researched and written by an independent panel commissioned 
by the government, was released to the public on August 24, 
2004.7  Finally, the Jones-Fay Army Report, commissioned by 
the United States Army and compiled by Lieutenant General 
Anthony R. Jones and Major General George R. Fay, was 
declassified and released to the public on August 25, 2004.8 
While the Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones-Fay Reports 
evaluate allegations of prisoner abuse at the Abu Ghraib 
  
 4 Id. § 3(a). 
 5 Although a series of reports address the instances of abuse at Abu Ghraib, 
it appears that Representative Holt lends a tremendous amount of credence to three of 
them.  See 151 CONG. REC. E15, supra note 1 (stating that “[l]ast year, three reports 
that were compiled by U.S. Army officers and the bipartisan investigative commission 
appointed by U.S. Defense Secretary Rumsfeld documented in horrifying detail the 
egregious human rights abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib Prison . . . .”).  From 
Representative Holt’s description of these reports, it can be inferred that he was 
referencing the Taguba Report, the Schlesinger Report and the Jones-Fay Report 
discussed in greater detail above.  Accordingly, this paper will refrain from engaging in 
a lengthy discussion of additional released reports and instead rely on the 
aforementioned three reports’ findings.  For a list of Abu Ghraib investigative reports 
completed or underway as of August 23 2004, see http://www.cbc.ca/ 
news/background/iraq/prisonabuse_inquiries.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005) (follow 
hyperlinks for specific reports). 
 6 ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY 
POLICE BRIGADE 1 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT], available at 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/taguba_report.pdf.  General Sanchez of 
the United States Army appointed Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba to write the report on 
January 31, 2004 after the International Committee of the Red Cross [hereinafter 
ICRC] planned to submit a twenty-four page written report to the United States 
detailing abuses to Abu Ghraib detainees by members of the United States military 
intelligence personnel.  Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States 
Relating to International Law: U.S. Abuse of Iraqi Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison, 98 
AM. J. INT’L. L. 591, 594 (2004). 
 7 JAMES R. SCHLESINGER, FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO 
REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS (2004) [hereinafter SCHLESINGER REPORT], 
available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/schlesingerreport20040824.pdf. 
 8 GEORGE R. FAY & ANTHONY R. JONES, AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU 
GHRAIB PRISON AND 205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE [hereinafter JONES-FAY 
REPORT], available at http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/iraq/pdf/fay_report20040825.pdf.  
The Jones-Fay Report is actually a compilation of two separate reports.  For 
clarification purposes, citations to the Jones-Fay Report will be followed by “Part I” or 
“Part II.”  Part I refers to Jones’ report while Part II refers to Fay’s report. 
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detention facility, each report investigates the problem from a 
different angle.  The Taguba Report explores the effectiveness 
of the 800th Military Police Brigade’s9 detention procedures at 
the prison.10  The Jones-Fay Report assesses whether members 
of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade11 “requested, 
encouraged, condoned, or solicited [800th Military Police 
Brigade] personnel to abuse detainees” and whether Military 
Intelligence personnel “comported with established 
interrogation procedures and applicable laws and 
regulations.”12  Finally, the Schlesinger Report provides a 
general analysis of what factors resulted in detainee 
operational and interrogation difficulties at Abu Ghraib and 
what corrective measures can be taken to remedy the 
problem.13 
Each of the reports make two consistent findings.  First, 
Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel stationed at 
Abu Ghraib lacked extensive training in the Geneva 
Conventions.14  Second, confusion existed among Military Police 
and Military Intelligence personnel as to how to apply the 
Geneva Conventions to the War in Iraq.15  The reports’ findings 
  
 9 The 800th Military Police Brigade, based in Uniondale, New York, was 
responsible for running the Abu Ghraib prison.  Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 
593. 
 10 TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 6, para. 3.  Specifically, the Taguba 
Report “[i]nvestigate[s] the training, standards, employment, command policies, 
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade . . . .”  Id. at 7, ¶ 
3(c). 
 11 The 205th Military Intelligence Brigade screened and interrogated 
detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison.  JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (Part I).   
 12 Id. at 4 (Part II). 
 13 SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 21. 
 14 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 114 (Part II) (“Interrogator 
training in the Laws of Land Warfare and the Geneva Conventions is ineffective.”); 
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 44 (Director of the Joint Interrogation and 
Debriefing Center at Abu Ghraib “failed to properly train and control his soldiers and 
failed to ensure prisoners were afforded the protections under the relevant Geneva 
Conventions.”); TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20 (Military Police personnel 
received “very little instruction or training . . . on the . . . Geneva Convention[s]” and 
“few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to [Military 
Police] personnel or detainees.”). 
 15 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (Part II) (“Soldiers on the 
ground are confused about how they apply the Geneva Conventions and whether they 
have a duty to report violations of the conventions.”); SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 
7, at 82 (While the senior leadership at Abu Ghraib understood that the Geneva 
Conventions applied “[t]he message in the field, or the assumptions made in the field, 
at times lost sight of this underpinning.”); TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 44 (The 
Commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade failed to ensure that her soldiers 
“knew, understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.”).  
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and recommendations suggest that while some of the Military 
Police and Military Intelligence personnel stationed at Abu 
Ghraib intentionally committed sexual abuses and caused 
bodily harm to prison detainees for sadistic purposes, a large 
number of the abuses resulted from “misinterpretations of law 
or policy or resulted from confusion about what interrogation 
techniques were permitted by law . . . .”16  The abuses at Abu 
Ghraib cannot be attributed solely to the actions “of a few 
bad[ ]apple[s]”17 who chose not to abide by standard military 
procedures.  Rather, they must also be viewed as the product of 
numerous Executive Branch and military policy errors that 
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill fails to fully address. 
After the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks, the 
Bush administration “attempted to build on precedents 
established during past wars to support extraordinarily broad 
claims of executive power.”18  President Bush employed his 
Commander-in-Chief authority to suspend the application of 
the Geneva Conventions to suspected al Qaeda and Taliban 
members detained in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.19  In addition, the Bush administration authorized the 
use of coercive interrogation methods that arguably violated 
general humanitarian principles as well as specific Geneva 
Conventions provisions.20 
Unlike in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay, the Bush 
administration currently insists that most prisoners21 detained 
  
 16 JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 16 (Part I).  See also SCHLESINGER 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 68. 
 17 John Barry, et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK ONLINE, May 24, 2004, 
at ¶ 2, at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4989422/site/newsweek. 
 18 Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva 
Conventions?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 97, 100 (2004).   
 19 See SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHAIN OF COMMAND: THE ROAD FROM 9/11 TO ABU 
GHRAIB 17-18 (2004).  See infra Part III.A.  
 20 See Mark A. Drumbl, Symposium, ‘Terrorism on Trial’: Lesser Evils in the 
War on Terrorism, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 335, 337 (2004) (finding that “[m]any 
experts agree that the detentions, as well as interrogation methods deployed against 
the detainees [in Guantanamo Bay], run afoul of international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.”); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and 
Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of 
Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 811, 824 (2005) (arguing that the Bush 
administration’s authorization of severe interrogation tactics in Afghanistan was 
illegal and violated “Geneva law and nonderogable human rights.”); See infra Part 
III.B.   
 21 See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Action Bars Rights of Some Captured in Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A6 (stating that “[a] new legal opinion by the Bush 
administration has concluded for the first time that some non-Iraqi prisoners captured 
by American forces in Iraq are not entitled to the protections of the Geneva 
Conventions . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
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in Iraq should be afforded full protection under the Geneva 
Conventions.22  Irrespective of the Executive Branch’s 
contention on this matter, President Bush’s failure to initially 
outline a clear Geneva Conventions policy in Iraq facilitated 
the prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib.23  The Bush administration 
assumed that all military personnel understood that the 
Geneva Conventions applied in Iraq.24  However, in light of the 
Executive Branch’s self-proclaimed “war on terror” and the 
suspension of the Geneva Conventions in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay, this assumption appears to be unfounded.25   
As written, the Interrogation Bill serves as a superficial 
response to a complex problem.  While it succeeds in 
establishing deterrent measures that will assist in reducing 
individual instances of abuse,26 it misses the mark in 
addressing the Executive Branch’s policy errors that 
contributed to widespread detainee mistreatment.  Instead of 
relying solely on reactive methods to prevent another Abu 
Ghraib atrocity, Congress must require the President to clearly 
articulate whether and how the Geneva Conventions apply at 
the onset of every military crisis.  The Bush Administration’s 
decision to withhold Geneva Conventions protections to al 
Qaeda prisoners effectively eradicated the pre-9/11 
presumption that the treaty’s provisions apply to all captured 
  
 22 U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Media 
Availability Enroute to Baghdad (May 13, 2004), http://www.defenselink.mil/ 
transcripts/2004/tr20040513-secdef0749.html (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld as saying 
Geneva Conventions “III and IV apply for the Iraqi prisoners of war and apply to the 
civilian non-military detainees.  That has been the case from the beginning.”).  But cf. 
REED BRODY, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 7 (June 2004), 
available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/usa0604.pdf (“On May 5, 2004, 
[Secretary Rumsfeld] told a television interviewer the Geneva Conventions ‘did not 
apply precisely’ in Iraq but were ‘basic rules’ for handling prisoners.”) (quoting United 
States Department of Defense News Transcript, Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with 
Matt Lauer, NBC “The Today Show,” (May 5, 2004), http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/ 
2004/tr20040505-secdef1425.html). 
 23 See infra Part IV.B.ii.a. 
 24 See HERSH, supra note 19, at 5 (quoting White House Counsel Alberto 
Gonzales as saying that “President [Bush] had ‘made no formal determination’ 
invoking the Geneva Conventions before the March 2003 invasion of Iraq . . . ‘because 
it was automatic that Geneva would apply’ and it was assumed that the military 
commanders in the field would ensure that their interrogation policies complied with 
the President’s stated view.”).   
 25 In fact, President Bush’s suspension of the Geneva Conventions in 
Afghanistan and Cuba led some military personnel stationed in Iraq to believe that 
their detainees need not be afforded treaty protections.  Paust, supra note 20, at 849.   
 26 The Interrogation Bill’s videotape requirement and unfettered access 
requirement are examples of such deterrent measures.  See generally Interrogation 
Bill, supra note 1. 
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detainees.27  Moreover, if the President seeks to violate the 
Geneva Conventions during a military campaign, he may only 
do so with the Legislative Branch’s express approval.28 
This Note challenges Congress’ proposed response to the 
Abu Ghraib prison atrocity.  Part II begins with a general 
description of the Geneva Conventions and other laws and 
international treaties signed and ratified by the United States 
to protect individuals held in U.S. custody from inhumane 
treatment.  Part III traces the evolution of United States Army 
interrogation techniques from the period immediately 
preceding September 11, 2001 to the present.  Part IV 
discusses the specific types of torture endured by detainees 
housed at the Abu Ghraib detention facility and also analyzes 
the Executive Branch mistakes that caused these abuses.  Part 
V argues that Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill does not 
adequately address the underlying policy problems confronting 
the United States Army with regard to interrogation tactics 
and detention procedures in Iraq.  Finally, this Note concludes 
by proposing and evaluating a substitute bill that will reduce 
the number of prisoner abuses at Abu Ghraib and other 
detention facilities by eradicating misinterpretations of law 
and policy within the military. 
II. THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 
A number of international laws and conventions seek to 
mitigate or prevent abuses during war by advancing the jus in 
bello, or “the rightful manner of war.”29  In general, 
international humanitarian law prohibits “unnecessary 
suffering”30 and “set[s] [specific] limits on how war may be 
waged.”31  Indeed, the United States is a party to the Geneva 
Conventions which, among other things, regulate the 
treatment of prisoners of war (“POWs”) by banning the practice 
  
 27 See infra IV.B.ii.a.  
 28 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 154 (arguing “that the Constitution is 
best interpreted to require the President to obtain congressional approval, in the form 
of legislation, if he wants to violate a treaty provision that is the law of the land.”). 
 29 MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 180 (3d ed. 
1999).  See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 108.  
 30 JANIS, supra note 29, at 180.  See also WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW:  A CONCISE INTRODUCTION 311 (2d ed. 1991). 
 31 See Randall P. Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law:  What’s the 
Relationship?, at 49 (Aug. 23, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/355. 
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of torture.32  Although there are four different Geneva 
Conventions that the United States signed in 1949 and 
supplemented with two protocols in 1977, this Note will focus 
on Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War (“Convention III”).33  The international community’s 
prohibition on torture is more generally stated in the 
Convention Against Torture34 and the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights,35 additional treaties to which the 
United States is also a party.36  However, two primary issues 
arising out of the Abu Ghraib prison scandal are whether all 
Military Police and Military Intelligence personnel knew that 
Convention III applied to soldiers captured and detained in 
Iraq and whether they fully understood the content of the 
treaty’s articles.  Accordingly, this section explores the general 
  
 32 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 108-10.  
 33 Erin Chlopak, Dealing with the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Obligations Under the Geneva Conventions, 9 HUM. 
RTS. BR. 6, 6 (2002).  The other three conventions are Convention I for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Convention II 
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea and Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War.  Id. 
 34 Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture defines torture as: 
[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or 
a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a 
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or 
other person acting in an official capacity. 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec.10, 1984, art. 1, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 35 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that “No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to 
medical or scientific experimentation.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, art. 76, I.L.M. 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 36 Domestically, the United States enacted a law that criminalizes the 
commission of torture by U.S. citizens on foreign soil.  The United States Code defines 
torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or 
suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
physical control.”  18 U.S.C. § 2340.  The penalty for the commission or attempted 
commission of torture by a U.S. citizen on foreign soil is no more than twenty years’ 
imprisonment.  However, if torture results in the death of one or more individuals, the 
crime is punishable by death or life imprisonment.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2340A.  The United 
States also enacted the War Crimes Act that criminalizes the violation of the Geneva 
Conventions and other treaties that govern the laws of war.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2441.  
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provisions of Convention III rather than other international 
treaties that espouse similar principles. 
A. Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War 
Convention III confers POW status on captured 
individuals who are military personnel of a party involved in 
an armed conflict between one or more states.37  A “de facto 
state of armed conflict” as opposed to a formal declaration of 
war is enough to trigger Convention III protections.38  Both 
states remain bound to the Convention even if one of the 
warring states is not an official party to the treaty.39  In 
addition to armed conflict between states, Convention III also 
applies in non-international conflicts, including civil wars and 
other instances in which one or both of the warring parties are 
not official states.40 
Convention III delineates “modest but important 
humanitarian guarantees”41 for POWs, some of which pertain 
to interrogation tactics.  Specifically, Convention III requires 
that all POWs “must . . . be humanely treated”42 and that they 
“are entitled . . . to respect for their persons and their 
honour.”43  “[O]utrages upon personal dignity,” including 
torture, mutilation or any other form of degrading treatment, 
are strictly prohibited.44  POWs must be afforded the right to 
attend religious services of their faith provided that they are 
not proven to have disciplinary problems.45  In addition, their 
housing conditions are to be “as favourable as those for 
the . . . Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area.”46  
In terms of interrogation tactics, the Convention explicitly 
  
 37 See Chlopak, supra note 33, at 8. 
 38 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 109.  
 39 Id.  
 40 The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Human Rights 
Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation of Detainees, 59 THE RECORD 
271, 275-76 (2004) [hereinafter Human Rights Standards].  Only article 3, as opposed 
to “the full protection of [Convention III], applies to non-international armed conflicts.”  
Id.  See also Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 110. 
 41 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 110. 
 42 Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, art. 13, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Convention III]. 
 43 Id. art. 14. 
 44 Id. art. 3. 
 45 Id. art. 34. 
 46 Id. art. 25. 
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prohibits “physical or mental torture, [and] any other form of 
coercion” for the purpose of procuring intelligence 
information.47  POWs are only required to disclose their first 
names, rank, army serial number and date of birth to detaining 
officials.48  Those prisoners who choose not to answer questions 
beyond that cannot be “threatened, insulted, or exposed to 
unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.”49 
B. Implementation and Enforcement 
The Geneva Conventions’ primary purpose is to make 
“human rights binding law.”50  While Convention III clearly 
identifies what protections should be afforded to POWs who are 
taken into custody during an armed conflict, problems can 
arise in implementing and enforcing its provisions.51  United 
Nations agencies or their subcommittees are primarily 
responsible for ensuring that signatories to a treaty uphold 
their promises to respect human rights.52  However, 
enforcement can become burdensome because, among other 
reasons, United Nations agencies are not authorized to punish 
treaty violators.53   
Independent, nonpolitical institutions interested in 
preventing international humanitarian rights violations 
confront similar problems.  For example, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ (“ICRC”)54 inspections of the Abu 
Ghraib detention facility revealed inhumane prisoner abuses.55  
Instead of remedying the problems discovered, ICRC agents’ 
recourse was limited to submitting a report to the United 
  
 47 Id. art. 17. 
 48 Convention III, art. 17. 
 49 Id. 
 50 LEVI, supra note 30, at 311. 
 51 See id. at 183 (arguing that the implementation and enforcement of human 
rights protections in international treaties can be difficult). 
 52 See id.  
 53 See id. at 184. 
 54 The ICRC is “an independent, neutral organization” designed to ensure 
“humanitarian protection and assistance for victims of war and armed violence[.]”.  See 
generally ICRC Homepage, http://www.icrc.org/eng (last visited Aug. 29, 2005). 
 55 See REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) 
ON THE TREATMENT BY THE COALITION FORCES OF PRISONERS OF WAR AND OTHER 
PROTECTED PERSONS BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN IRAQ DURING ARREST, 
INTERNMENT AND INTERROGATION 3 (2004), available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/ 
lweb/indiv/usgd/hotdocs.html (follow “Report of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross” hyperlink) [hereinafter ICRC REPORT]. 
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States government that explained their committee’s findings.56  
The process of conducting the inspections, writing the report 
and waiting for the United States government to respond took 
almost a full year and enabled the cycle of abuse to continue at 
Abu Ghraib.57  In order to circumvent damaging bureaucratic 
delays, Congress must act preemptively and pass laws that 
identify and address the fundamental causes of prisoner abuse 
abroad.  Although a solid attempt, the Interrogation Bill does 
not correct the underlying policy problems that existed at the 
Abu Ghraib detention facility; it merely restates a failed 
proposition.58  This Note recommends a more effective bill in 
Part V. 
III. EVOLUTION OF INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES  
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States 
drastically altered the Bush administration’s willingness to 
adhere to preexisting international law.59  Cofer Black, the 
former director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
counterterrorism unit, testified before Congress in early 2002 
that “[t]here was a before-9/11 and an after-9/11” and that 
“[a]fter 9/11 the gloves came off.”60  Prior to the al Qaeda 
attacks, the United States Military applied the Geneva 
Conventions “broadly” and provided protection to all 
  
 56 See Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 594 (explaining that “[f]rom the 
start of the occupation of Iraq, representatives of the [ICRC] were allowed access to 
Iraqi detainees . . . and . . . regularly submitted observations and recommendations to 
the coalition forces regarding the treatment of such detainees.”). 
 57 The ICRC conducted inspections between March and November 2003.  
ICRC REPORT, supra note 55, at 3.  The United States government received a copy of 
the report in February 2004.  Id. at 1. 
 58 The Interrogation Bill provides that various agencies be “immediately 
granted unfettered access to detainees or prisoners in the custody or under the effective 
control of the armed forces of the United States.”  Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 2.  
As noted earlier, however, the ICRC’s “unfettered access” to the Abu Ghraib prison did 
not succeed in ending the cycle of abuse.  See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text. 
 59 BRODY, supra note 22, at 1.  President Bush embraced White House 
Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales’ argument that “the ‘nature of the new war’ on 
terrorism places such a premium on getting information from captured terrorists 
quickly, that ‘[t]his new paradigm’ makes the restrictions of [Convention 
III] . . . ‘obsolete.’”  Barry C. Scheck, The ‘New Paradigm’ and Our Civil Liberties,” 28-
AUG CHAMPION 4 (Aug. 2004).  See also Harold Hongju Koh, Jefferson Memorial 
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process After September 11th, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
337, 350 (finding that the “recent horrors at Abu Ghraib” demonstrate the Bush 
administration’s “strategy of condoning wide-scale departures from traditional 
prisoner-of-war protections.”). 
 60 Barry, supra note 17, at ¶ 3. 
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individuals captured in an international armed conflict.61  In 
accordance with the United States Constitution’s Supremacy 
Clause,62 the Geneva Conventions achieved the status of 
“supreme federal law” and could not be undermined or ignored 
unless one of two things occurred: (1) a particular Geneva 
Convention treaty provision “exceed[ed] the scope of the treaty-
makers’ domestic lawmaking powers”; or (2) “a subsequent 
inconsistent treaty or statute supersede[d] the [Geneva 
Convention] treaty provision at issue.”63  Prior to the terrorist 
attacks, the government did not seek to undercut the United 
States’ obligations under the Geneva Conventions because, up 
until that point, the treaty did not interfere with any foreign 
engagement or military campaign.64 
In early 2002, however, President Bush concluded that 
terrorism could not be fought by strictly adhering to 
international rules of law.65  Officials from the White House, 
the Department of Defense, and the Department of Justice 
drafted a number of memoranda concerning the application of 
the Geneva Conventions to the War in Afghanistan and the 
implementation of interrogation policies for use on al Qaeda 
and Taliban detainees.66  According to White House Counsel 
Judge Alberto Gonzales, the documents “explore[d] the limits of 
the legal landscape as to what the Executive Branch can do 
within the law and the Constitution as an abstract matter.”67  
  
 61 BRODY, supra note 22, at 5. 
 62 The Supremacy Clause states that “all Treaties made . . . under the 
Authority of the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”  U.S. CONST. 
art. 6. 
 63 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 123-24. 
 64 In fact, on October 1, 1997, the government codified the Geneva 
Conventions in an Army Regulation handbook [Army Regulation 190-8], which 
established policies and procedures “‘for the administration, treatment, employment, 
and compensation of enemy prisoners of war . . . .’”  Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 
125 (quoting U.S. ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8, ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, 
RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES §1-1(a) (1997)).  
This handbook cited the Geneva Conventions as “directly binding on all U.S. military 
forces as a matter of . . . law, even where they conflict with the military’s own 
regulations.”  Id. 
 65 David J. Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449, 
453 (2005) (The Bush Administration “fairly quickly decided that the threat it was 
facing was entirely unprecedented.  Existing treaties were seen as impediments to be 
overcome.  Concerned with the need to acquire as much ‘actionable intelligence’ as 
possible, by whatever means, the Administration adopted a strategy to permit 
something close to unfettered power in dealing with terrorist suspects.”).  
 66 See BRODY, supra note 22, at 5-6.  See also Neil MacMmaster, Torture: 
from Algiers to Abu Ghraib, 46 RACE & CLASS 1, 17-18 (2004). 
 67 Press Briefing by White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales, Dep’t of 
Def. Gen. Counsel William Haynes, Dep’t of Def. Deputy Gen. Counsel Daniel Dell’Orto 
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After reviewing the parties’ arguments, President Bush 
determined that terrorists or suspected terrorists would be 
deemed “unlawful combatants” and denied protections under 
Convention III.68  President Bush provided leeway for the 
implementation of harsh interrogation policies by holding that 
unlawful combatants should be treated in a manner consistent 
with the Geneva Conventions but that “military necessity” 
ultimately dictates detainee treatment.69  The Bush 
administration’s unwillingness to offer full Convention III 
protections to terrorists coupled with its hesitancy to 
completely ignore established international law resulted in the 
breakdown of a clear Geneva Conventions policy in Iraq, 
including the Abu Ghraib detention facility.70 
A. Applicability of Geneva Convention III to the War in 
Afghanistan 
Legal memoranda71 written by White House Counsel, 
the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice 
influenced President Bush’s decision not to apply Convention 
III to Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners.  In a document dated 
January 22, 2002, Assistant Attorney General Jay S. Bybee 
expressed the view that al Qaeda is “not a nation-State”72 or 
  
and Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Gen. Keith Alexander (June 22, 2004) 
(transcript available at www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/06/20040622-14.html 
[hereinafter Press Briefing]. 
 68 See Barry, supra note 17, at ¶ 9.   
 69 Memorandum from President Bush to the Vice President, et al. 2 (Feb. 7, 
2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 
(follow “Feb 7, 2002 – Memo from President Bush” hyperlink)  [hereinafter Bush 
Memorandum].   
 70 See Drumbl, supra note 20, at 339-40 (Finding that “[t]here is cause to 
believe that [the] memoranda [pertaining to the War in Afghanistan], along with other 
deliberate decisions made at senior levels to circumscribe the role of law, had an 
impact upon the degree of respect for law in the Abu Ghraib prison . . . .”); see infra 
Parts III.B, IV.B.2.a; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 71 On June 22, 2004, both the White House and the Department of Defense 
released a total of twenty-eight documents regarding the Administration’s military 
interrogation policies since September 11, 2001.  At least six additional documents, 
including the Taguba report, were leaked to the news media and are now available to 
the public as well.  For a complete list of all available and unavailable documents 
pertaining to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions abroad as well as U.S. 
military interrogation procedures, see The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. 
Policy and Methods from the National Security Archive Website, 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (last 
visited Nov. 7, 2005).  Because the content of many of the letters and memoranda is 
repetitive, only a limited number of the documents will be referenced in this Section.  
 72 Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee, from the Office of 
Legal Counsel at the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to White House Counsel Judge Alberto 
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“High Contracting Party”73 as required under Convention III.  
Rather, he believed al Qaeda should be classified as a “non-
governmental terrorist organization composed of members from 
many nations, with ongoing operations in dozens of nations.”74  
According to Bybee’s interpretation of Convention III, non-
governmental organizations cannot be recognized as parties to 
the treaty and therefore should not be provided the protection 
of its provisions.75  Bybee also concluded that President Bush 
reserved the right to suspend U.S. treaty obligations to 
Afghanistan because it was a non-functioning state and the 
Taliban militia was not a valid government.76  President Bush’s 
acceptance of Bybee’s determinations would effectively 
accomplish two tasks.  First, the trials and long-term 
detentions of al Qaeda terrorists would not be subject to 
humanitarian protections under Convention III.77  Second, 
because Afghanistan constituted a “failed state,” Taliban 
military personnel would also not receive POW status under 
Convention III.78 
White House Counsel Judge Alberto Gonzales agreed 
with Bybee that Taliban and al Qaeda detainees should not be 
afforded POW status under Convention III.  In a January 25, 
2002 memorandum to President Bush, Gonzales argued that 
the conflict in Afghanistan did not “form[ ] the backdrop” for the 
Geneva Conventions.79  He believed that the war against 
terrorism constituted a new kind of war that demanded the 
procurement of valuable intelligence information from captured 
  
Gonzales, and Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Def. William J. Haynes II, at 1 (Jan. 22, 
2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 
(follow “Jan 22, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02].  The term 
“nation-state” has been used synonymously with the term “nation.”  Symposium, 
Conceptions of International Peace Environmental Rights: “The Remains of the Day,” 59 
TENN. L. REV. 651, 657 (1992).   
 73 Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 9.  Convention III applies to 
“all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two 
or more of the High Contracting Parties . . . .”  Convention III, supra note 42, art. 2.  A 
“High Contracting Party is a country, or sovereign state, that has signed the Geneva 
Conventions.”  Heather Alexander, Comment, Justice for Rwanda Toward a Universal 
Law of Armed Conflict, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 427, 434 n.55 (2004). 
 74 Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 9.  
 75 Id. at 10. 
 76 Id. at 10-11. 
 77 Id. at 9-10. 
 78 Id. at 10-11. 
 79 Memorandum from White House Counsel Judge Alberto R. Gonzales, to 
President George W. Bush (Jan. 25, 2002), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/ 
newsweek/ (follow “January 25, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Gonzales Memorandum]. 
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terrorists.80  Gonzales further argued that in order to preserve 
interrogation flexibility, the Geneva Conventions must be 
rendered obsolete.81  Irrespective of the inapplicability of 
Convention III, Gonzales concluded that the United States 
should still be “constrained” by “its commitment to treat the 
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and 
consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with 
the principles of [Convention III].”82  Gonzales adopted from 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld the argument that the 
Geneva Conventions do not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan 
but that Taliban and al Qaeda detainees should be treated in a 
humane manner.83  The negative effects resulting from the 
Executive Branch’s endorsement of these two seemingly 
irreconcilable viewpoints ultimately extended to the Abu 
Ghraib prison facility.84 
In response to Gonzales’ memorandum, an “outraged”85 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell expressed his concern that 
the United States had never before determined that 
Convention III did not apply to an armed conflict involving its 
military.86  Powell also disagreed with Gonzales’ memorandum 
insofar as it did “not squarely present to the President the 
options that [were] available to him.  Nor [did] it identify the 
  
 80 Id.  
 81 Id. 
 82 Id.  
 83 On January 19, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld requested 
that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff inform all combatant commanders in 
Afghanistan that “Al Qaida and Taliban individuals under the control of the 
Department of Defense are not entitled to prisoner of war status for purposes of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949” but that they should be treated “in a manner consistent 
with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949.”  Memorandum from Sec’y of 
Def., Donald Rumsfeld to the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Jan. 19, 2002), 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow 
“Jan 19, 2002” hyperlink).  Two days later, the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
transmitted Rumsfeld’s requested message to the military commanders in Afghanistan.  
See Message from the Chairman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Military Commanders 
in Afg. (Jan. 21, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp? 
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Jan 21, 2002” hyperlink); see also BRODY, supra 
note 22, at 5. 
 84 See infra Part IV.B.2.a.  See also supra notes 25 and 70 and accompanying 
text.   
 85 Paust, supra note 20, at 826.  
 86 Memorandum from Sec’y of State, Colin L. Powell, to White House Counsel 
and the Assistant to the President for Nat’l Sec. Affairs 5 (Jan. 26, 2002), 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow 
“Jan 26, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum].  See Drumbl, supra note 
20, at 338 (“Secretary of State Colin Powell submitted a sharp critique of [Gonzales’] 
recommendation.”). 
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significant pros and cons of each option.”87  Despite his deep-
seaed conviction that Convention III should not be limited,88 
Powell drafted his memorandum with the intent to clarify 
Gonzales’ propositions.89  In option one, Convention III would 
not apply to the conflict in Afghanistan because it is a failed 
state and cannot be regarded as a High Contracting Party.90  In 
option two, Convention III would apply to the conflict in 
Afghanistan, but al Qaeda and Taliban detainees would 
neither be afforded any protections nor be entitled to POW 
status.91  Powell preferred the latter option because option one 
would “reverse over a century of U.S. policy and practice in 
supporting the Geneva Conventions and undermine the 
protections of the law of war for our troops . . . .”92  Under both 
alternatives, however, Powell embraced the Gonzales/Rumsfeld 
view that all detainees should be treated in a manner 
consistent with Convention III principles.93 
On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a formal 
memorandum regarding the applicability of Convention III to 
al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, in which he made five crucial 
determinations.  First, Convention III does not apply to al 
Qaeda primarily because it is not a High Contracting Party.94  
Second, Convention III applies to the conflict with the 
Taliban,95 but the President possesses the authority to suspend 
all protections in Afghanistan at any point.96  Third, Article 3 of 
Convention III does not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban 
detainees because the “conflicts are international in scope 
and . . . Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an 
  
 87 Powell Memorandum, supra note 86, at 1.  
 88 Id. at 1-4. 
 89 Id. at 1. 
 90 Id.  
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 2. 
 93 See Powell Memorandum, supra note 86, at 5.  
 94 See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1. 
 95 President Bush’s second determination is somewhat confusing.  After 
reviewing all four of the President’s conclusions, it can be inferred that Convention III 
applies to the conflict in Afghanistan generally, but that al Qaeda and Taliban 
detainees do not qualify for POW status.  Id.  See Human Rights Standards, supra note 
40, at 275 (finding that the “President accepted application of the Geneva Conventions 
in principle to the conflict with the Taliban, while asserting that Taliban personnel did 
not qualify under [Convention] III for status as prisoners of war.  However, the 
Administration denied that the Geneva Conventions applied at all to Al Qaeda and to 
the broader War on Terror, although it announced that it would adhere to comparable 
humanitarian standards.”). 
 96 Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1-2. 
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international character.’”97  Fourth, Taliban detainees are 
unlawful combatants and do not qualify as POWs under 
Convention III.  Finally, because al Qaeda is not protected 
under Convention III, al Qaeda detainees do not qualify for 
POW status either.98  President Bush’s determinations created 
an avenue by which Convention III did not need to be applied 
to the Taliban conflict thus, “preserv[ing] maximum flexibility 
with the least restraint by international law.”99  These same 
determinations led some military personnel stationed at Abu 
Ghraib to improperly conclude that they could deny Geneva 
law protections to a number of their detainees as well.100 
B. Authorized Interrogation Tactics in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay 
After President Bush determined that the Geneva 
Conventions do not protect al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, a 
series of memoranda101 circulated throughout the White House, 
Department of Defense and Department of Justice regarding 
the implementation of interrogation procedures in Afghanistan 
and Guantanamo Bay.102  A number of these documents 
addressed whether 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,103 the statutes 
that criminalize the commission of torture by U.S. citizens on 
foreign soil, could impede the military’s ability to employ harsh 
interrogation methods abroad.  Both the Department of Justice 
and the White House expressed the view that even if specific 
interrogation methods violated the United States Code, the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, could still utilize “flexible” 
interrogation methods for the purpose of gaining intelligence 
information concerning the enemy’s military plans.104  In 
  
 97 Id. at 2. 
 98 Id.  
 99 Human Rights Standards, supra note 40, at 275. 
 100 See supra notes 25 and 70 and accompanying text.  
 101 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.   
 102 In January 2002, the United States began sending individuals “picked up 
during the armed conflict in Afghanistan” to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  The naval base 
located there ultimately housed over 700 detainees from forty-four countries.  BRODY, 
supra note 22, at 5. 
 103 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 104 See Memorandum from Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee, from the Office 
of Legal Counsel at the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President 31 (Aug. 1, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp? 
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Aug 1, 2002” hyperlink) [hereinafter Bybee 
Memorandum 8/1/02].  See also Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in 
the Global War on Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational 
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support of this proposition, the Department of Justice and the 
White House argued that Congress lacks the authority “to set 
the terms and conditions under which the President may 
exercise his authority as Commander-in-Chief to control the 
conduct of operations during a war.”105  The President alone is 
vested with the “entire charge of hostile operations”106 and thus 
far, Congress has not interfered with this authority.107   
The Department of Justice also concluded that the 
definition of torture articulated in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
only covers “extreme acts” and that there exist a number of 
interrogation methods that may be regarded as cruel, 
inhumane or degrading but do not technically constitute 
torture.108  Specifically, the Department of Justice concluded 
that the infliction of severe mental and physical pain does not 
constitute torture unless the pain is intended to have lasting 
psychological effects or cause death or organ failure.109  Under 
this definition, the beating of a prisoner into unconsciousness 
or the breaking of his bones would not violate federal law.110 
The Government’s analysis of domestic laws reached 
high-ranking military personnel stationed in Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba.111  Major General Michael B. Dunlavey responded to the 
Department of Justice and the White House’s discourse 
regarding the President’s responsibility to adhere to the United 
States Code with a request for the authorization of more 
aggressive interrogation techniques at the Guantanamo Bay 
naval base.112  The Military Intelligence personnel stationed 
abroad felt constrained by the procedures outlined in the Army 
  
Considerations 21 (Apr. 4, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/ 
documents/040403.pdf [hereinafter Working Group Report] (stating that “Congress 
may no more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy 
combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on the 
battlefield.”).  This report was prepared for Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld by a 
group of executive branch attorneys.  See Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 592. 
 105 Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 34-35.  See Working Group 
Report, supra note 104, at 21-22.  
 106 Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 34 (quoting Hamilton v. 
Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 87 (1874)).  See Working Group Report, supra note 104, at 20. 
 107 Bybee Memorandum 8/1/02, supra note 104, at 39.  
 108 Id. at 46.   
 109 Id.   
 110 Peter Irons, William Howard Taft Lecture: “The Constitution Is Just a 
Scrap of Paper:” Empire Versus Democracy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081, 1089 (2005).   
 111 See Memorandum from Major Gen. Michael B. Dunlavey, Dep’t of Def., 
Joint Task Force 170, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Commander for the U.S. Southern 
Command (Oct. 11, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp? 
objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow “Oct 11, 2002” hyperlink).   
 112 Id. 
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FM 34-52 Intelligence Interrogation Manual.113  In light of 
President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive that the Geneva 
Conventions do not apply to unlawful combatants, it can be 
argued that the aforementioned personnel desired a clear 
policy on permissible interrogation methods as well.   
Secretary Rumsfeld subsequently approved a list of 
proposed interrogation techniques114 including, but not limited 
to, yelling, the use of stress positions for a maximum of four 
hours,115 deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, the use of 
twenty-hour interrogations, removal of clothing, forced 
grooming, using detainees’ individual phobias to induce stress 
and the use of “mild, non-injurious physical contact such as 
grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light 
pushing.”116  Secretary Rumsfeld later rescinded his broad-
based approval for the interrogation techniques, arguing that 
the methods could not be employed without “a thorough 
justification” and “a detailed plan for [their] use.”117  He 
concluded by reaffirming his position that detainees must be 
treated in a humane manner during interrogations.118  
Following the submission of an Executive Branch report 
regarding permissible detainee interrogations in the war 
against terrorism, Secretary Rumsfeld again modified the 
  
 113 The Schlesinger Report indicates that Major General Michael B. 
Dunlavey’s request was a reaction “to tenacious resistance by some detainees to 
existing interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army Field 
Manual 34-52.”  SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.  The Army FM 34-52 
Intelligence Interrogation Manual provides that the “use of force, mental torture, 
threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is 
prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the US Government.”  
Murphy, U.S. Abuse, supra note 6, at 592 (quoting U.S. ARMY, INTELLIGENCE 
INTERROGATION 34-52 ch. 1 (1987)).  
 114 See Action Memorandum from White House General Counsel William J. 
Haynes II to Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld (Nov. 27, 2002), 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow 
“Dec 2, 2002” hyperlink).  Secretary Rumsfeld officially approved the interrogation 
methods discussed in the memorandum on December 2, 2002.  Id.  
 115 Underneath his signature approving interrogation techniques discussed in 
the November 27, 2002 Action Memorandum, Secretary Rumsfeld handwrote the 
following statement: “I stand for 8-10 hours a day.  Why is standing [for interrogation 
purposes] limited to 4 hours?”  Id. 
 116 Memorandum from Jerald Phifer, LTC to Commander of Joint Task Force 
170 (Oct. 11, 2002), http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678 
&reqid=3164 (follow “Oct 11, 2002” hyperlink). 
 117 Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld to the Commander of 
the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (Jan. 15, 2003), 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow 
“Jan 15, 2003 – Department of Defense memo” hyperlink).   
 118 Id. 
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approved list of unlawful combatant interrogation 
techniques.119  Although the new techniques did not expressly 
authorize the use of physical contact or other methods that 
might violate international treaties and United States domestic 
laws,120 subsequent investigations revealed that many of the 
same methods previously approved, but later rescinded by 
Secretary Rumsfeld were actually still being utilized at 
Guantanamo Bay.121 
The numerous policy changes authorized by Secretary 
Rumsfeld demonstrate the government’s hesitancy to 
implement a clear interrogation policy with regard to unlawful 
combatants.  By determining that Convention III does not 
apply to unlawful combatants, yet arguing that these 
individuals should still be treated in a manner consistent with 
the treaty, the government created an amorphous set of 
guidelines that, in effect, authorized military personnel to 
haphazardly violate humanitarian standards.122  As a result, 
the long-standing assumption that the Geneva Conventions 
applied to all military campaigns was eradicated.123 
Secretary Rumsfeld’s authorization of coercive 
interrogation methods124 in conjunction with President Bush’s 
February 7, 2002 directive that unlawful combatants be treated 
in a manner consistent with Convention III caused confusion at 
the Abu Ghraib prison.125  The Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones-
  
 119 See Memorandum from Sec’y of Def. Donald Rumsfeld to Commander for 
the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) (April 16, 2003), 
http://digitalarchive.oclc.org/da/ViewObject.jsp?objid=0000007678&reqid=3164 (follow 
“Apr 16, 2003” hyperlink). 
 120 Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law:  General International and U.S. Foreign Relations Law:  Executive 
Branch Memoranda on Status and Permissible Treatment of Detainees, 98 AM. J. INT’L. 
L. 820, 828 (2004). 
 121 JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 29 (Part II).  Such techniques included 
the “use of stress positions, isolation for up to thirty days, removal of clothing, and the 
use of detainees’ phobias (such as the use of dogs).”  Id. 
 122 Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 455 (finding that while “Secretary Rumsfeld 
may not have specifically authorized the use of the worst tortures . . . there should be 
no mistaking of how short the distance was between practices that the reservists were 
authorized to engage in or thought they were authorized to engage in and the tortures 
and humiliations that were in fact committed.”). 
 123 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 124 See supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 125 Paust, supra note 20, at 849 (noting that some military personnel stationed 
in Iraq believed that Convention III protections could be suspended and harsh 
interrogation tactics utilized based on President Bush’s reasoning from his February 
7th memorandum); Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 449 (“The Government’s policies were a 
moral, legal, and political disaster.  At worst, these rules were seen as winking at 
torture.  At best, they sent confusing signals to American troops and contractors 
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Fay Reports conclude that the interrogation policies delineated 
by Secretary Rumsfeld and employed in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo Bay were unlawfully used at Abu Ghraib.126  
These errors could have been avoided had President Bush 
ensured that military personnel understood whether and how 
Convention III applied to the War in Iraq.127 
IV. ABUSES AND FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKES AT THE ABU 
GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY 
Neither President Bush nor the Department of Defense 
admitted to authorizing the incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib.128  
Nonetheless, a number of Military Police and Military 
Intelligence personnel working at the prison engaged in 
inhumane treatment and conducted unlawful interrogations of 
Iraqi detainees.129  An investigation into the policy errors at 
Abu Ghraib reveals a plethora of mistakes that could have been 
avoided had proper procedural safeguards been codified by 
Congress. 
A. Specific Allegations and Instances of Abuse 
The Taguba, Schlesinger, and Jones-Fay Reports reveal 
that Abu Ghraib detainees experienced “numerous incidents of 
sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses.”130  While the 
exact number of substantiated incidents of abuse varies in each 
report, it is generally agreed that between forty-four and fifty-
five unlawful acts transpired at the prison.131  The abuses 
  
in . . . Iraq.”).  See Michael Isikoff, Memos Reveal War Crimes Warning, NEWSWEEK 
ONLINE, May 17, 2004, at ¶ 9, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/4999734/site/newsweek/ 
(“Administration critics have charged that key legal decisions . . . including the White 
House’s February 2002 declaration not to grant any Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters 
prisoners of war status under the Geneva Convention, laid the groundwork for the 
interrogation abuses . . . in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.”). 
 126 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 8; SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 
7, at 68; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-15 (Part I). 
 127 See infra Part IV.B.2.a. 
 128 MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14 (“Bush and Rumsfeld . . . claimed 
ignorance of malpractice . . . .  Implicit in such a discourse was the claim that there was 
no systematic deployment of torture interrogation techniques in the US army and that 
sadistic acts were isolated to degraded individuals and did not reach up through the 
chain of command.”). 
 129 See infra Part IV.A.  
 130 See TAGUBA REPORT supra note 6, at 16.   
 131 The Schlesinger Report indicates that “[o]f the 66 already substantiated 
cases of abuse, eight occurred at Guantanamo, three in Afghanistan and 55 in Iraq.  
Only about one-third were related to interrogation, and two-thirds to other causes.”  
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 13.  In contrast, the Jones-Fay Report indicates 
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occurred at the hands of individual soldiers as well as small 
military groups.132  While the Schlesinger Report does not 
provide specific examples of the abuses,133 the other two reports 
convey the details of each act.   
The most severe forms of abuse occurred on the night 
shift of Tier 1 at Abu Ghraib134 and involved both physical 
attacks and sexual assaults.135  United States military 
personnel exclusively operated Tiers 1A and 1B, designated for 
military intelligence “holds,” while Iraqi prison guards 
supervised regular prisoners in Tiers 2 through 7.136  With 
regard to physical abuse, military personnel hit, punched, 
slapped and kicked detainees,137 sometimes until they were 
rendered unconscious.138  There are also reports of military 
personnel jumping on detainees’ feet and simulating electric 
torture by attaching wires to naked detainees’ extremities.139  
Dogs were frequently used to frighten detainees and on at least 
one occasion, to bite and severely injure a prisoner.140  In 
addition, twenty detainees died suspiciously while in U.S. 
military custody, but these deaths are still under 
investigation.141 
The sexual abuses at Abu Ghraib spanned from the 
photographing and videotaping of naked detainees142 to rape.143  
Other examples of abuse include forcing detainees to remain 
naked for days at a time144 as well as arranging naked male 
detainees into a pyramid formation and jumping on them.145  In 
  
that there were forty-four incidents of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.  JONES-FAY 
REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).   
 132 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).   
 133 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 12-13. 
 134 Id. at 43.  See also Edward T. Pound & Kit R. Roane, Hell on Earth, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP ONLINE., Jul. 19, 2004, at ¶¶ 21-23, at http://www.usnews.com/ 
usnews/news/articles/040719/19prison.htm. 
 135 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).  See also TAGUBA 
REPORT, supra note 6, at 18-19. 
 136 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 74. 
 137 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.  
 138 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).  
 139 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16-17.  
 140 Id. at 19. 
 141 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 13; MacMaster, supra note 66, 
at 15 (“In November 2003, one prisoner died under torture, but interrogators, it is 
alleged, were able to dispose of his body since the dead Iraqi was never entered into the 
inmate control system . . . .”). 
 142 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16. 
 143 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II). 
 144 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 16.  
 145 Id. at 17. 
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a few instances, Military Police personnel required male 
detainees to masturbate themselves146 and each other147 while 
being photographed and videotaped.  At the instruction of a 
Military Police guard, one naked detainee wore a dog chain 
around his neck so that a female guard could pose with him for 
a photograph.148  And finally, the words “I am a Rapest” [sic] 
were written on the body of a detainee accused of raping 
another prisoner.149 
B. The Causes of Abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention 
Facility 
The Schlesinger and Jones-Fay Reports acknowledge 
that the Abu Ghraib abuses stemmed from two very different 
types of improper conduct.  Some military personnel harmed 
detainees for sadistic and self-serving purposes.150  Others 
committed prisoner abuses either because they misinterpreted 
the law dictating what interrogation and detention methods 
could be employed, or because they did not know what 
interrogation methods were permissible.151  In the former 
instances, military personnel intentionally committed violent 
acts designed to inflict pain or embarrassment on to the 
detainees.152  In the latter instances, military personnel did not 
know, for a variety of reasons, that their actions violated 
Convention III.153   
1. Moral Corruption and Criminal Misconduct 
Social psychologists argue that the combination of 
different psychological154 and environmental risk factors155 can 
  
 146 Id. at 16. 
 147 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 9 (Part II).   
 148 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.  
 149 Id.  The Taguba Report lists additional abuses that he “find[s] credible 
based on the clarity of [the detainees’] statements and supporting evidence provided by 
other witnesses.”  Id.  These abuses include, but are not limited to, pouring phosphoric 
liquid from chemical lights on detainees, beating detainees with a broom handle and 
sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and a broom stick.  Id.   
 150 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (Part I).  See also SCHLESINGER 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 68. 
 151 See supra note 150.  
 152 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (Part I). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Some psychological factors to be considered include inherent personality 
traits, beliefs, attitudes, and values.  Emotional factors like “[a]nger, fear, and 
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motivate individuals and groups to act inhumanely.156  With 
regard to environmental risk factors, Military Police personnel 
at Abu Ghraib lacked sufficient training and staff support and 
constantly feared attacks from enemy forces.157  The stress of 
protecting themselves from outside threats and from 
potentially volatile detainees heightened the likelihood that 
Military Police personnel would engage in prisoner abuses.158  
In terms of psychological factors, the widespread practice of 
stripping detainees for interrogation purposes also contributed 
to the prevalence of abuse at the prison.159  Wearing clothes “is 
an inherently social practice, and therefore the stripping away 
of clothing may have had the unintended consequence of 
dehumanizing detainees in the eyes of those who interacted 
with them.”160  The “anti-social reactions” of the Military Police 
personnel demonstrate that pathological situations, like a 
prison environment, can modify the behavior of seemingly 
normal individuals.161 
Intentionally committed abuses can be prevented or 
curtailed through the use of reactive measures, some of which 
are articulated in the Interrogation Bill.162  Having said this, it 
  
emotional arousal can heighten the tendency to act out aggressively” as well.  
SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at app. G, at 4. 
 155 Environmental, or situational factors, such as the presence of weapons, 
verbal provocation, and physical discomfort can increase the likelihood that an 
individual will behave in an aggressive manner.  Id. 
 156 In a simulated prison experiment conducted at Stanford University in 
1973, twenty-four male college students were divided into two groups, prisoners and 
guards.  Id. at app. G, at 1.  The psychologists conducting the experiment did not direct 
the “guards” to behave in any specific manner towards their “prisoners,” in hopes of 
determining how wartime psychological and environmental stresses can affect an 
individual’s behavior.  Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. 
Prison Policy: Twenty-five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 710 (July 1998).  The study revealed that several of the “guards” 
devised sadistically inventive ways to harass and degrade the prisoners, and none of 
the “less actively cruel mock-guards ever intervened or complained about the abuses 
they witnessed.”  Id. at 709.  See Ralph R. Reiland, Unlearned Prison Lessons, 64 THE 
HUMANIST 18, 20-21 (2004).   
 157 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at app. G, at 7. 
 158 Id.  
 159 Id.  According to the Schlesinger Report, stripping detainees remains a 
popular military practice because it succeeds in making “detainees feel more 
vulnerable and therefore more compliant with interrogations.”  Id.   
 160 Id.  
 161 Craig Haney, Curtis Banks & Philip Zimbardo, Interpersonal Dynamics in 
a Simulated Prison, 1 INT’L J. CRIMINOLOGY & PENOLOGY 69, 90 (1973).  
 162 The Interrogation Bill requires that all interrogations “and other pertinent 
interactions” between a detainee and military personnel be videotaped.  Interrogation 
Bill, supra note 1, at 2; see supra note 2 and accompanying text.  Arguably, the fear of 
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is important for the Legislature to understand that wartime 
operations “carry inherent risks for human mistreatment”163 
and that laws dictating interrogation policies should perhaps 
include provisions that are not limited to the punishment of 
military personnel.  Had all Abu Ghraib military personnel 
unequivocally understood how to apply the Geneva 
Conventions to the War in Iraq, then perhaps the abuses would 
have been limited to isolated instances of torture that the 
Interrogation Bill directly addresses and seeks to punish.164  
This, however, is not the case.  Evidence suggests that in light 
of the Bush administration’s suspension of the Geneva 
Conventions to al Qaeda and Taliban detainees, Abu Ghraib 
military personnel did not understand the extent to which 
Convention III protected their prisoners.165  For this reason, the 
Interrogation Bill must be revised to include sections that 
require a clear Geneva Conventions policy to be announced at 
the onset of every military campaign. 
2. Misinterpretations of Law and Policy at Abu Ghraib 
a. Application of the Geneva Conventions in Iraq 
A second factor contributing to the abuses at Abu 
Ghraib was general confusion among military personnel as to 
what detention and interrogation techniques could be 
practiced.166  Much of this confusion stemmed from President 
Bush’s failure to indicate, in light of his determinations with 
regard to the War in Afghanistan, how treatment in a manner 
consistent with the Geneva Conventions differs from strict 
adherence to the Geneva Conventions.167  Lacking a definitive 
prisoner treatment and detention policy, the junior military 
personnel who engaged in the abuses relied on their 
  
getting caught on videotape will deter military personnel from committing violent acts 
against detainees. 
 163 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, app. G, at 1.  
 164 Interrogation Bill, supra note 1, § 1. 
 165 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.  
 166 SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra 
note 8, at 5 (Part 1). 
 167 Murphy, General International, supra note 120, at 830-31 (President Bush 
quoted as saying that the “authorization I issued was that anything we did would 
conform to U.S. law and would be consistent with international treaty obligations.”) 
(quoting The President’s News Conference in Savannah, Georgia, 40 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1049, 1051 (June 10, 2004)). 
2005] CONGRESS’ RESPONSE TO THE ABU GHRAIB ABUSES 969 
supervisors’ orders at Abu Ghraib.168  The supervisors, in turn, 
based their instructions both on the authorized tactics used 
during the Afghanistan conflict169 as well as the reasoning 
advanced in President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive and 
accompanying advisory memoranda.170  Thus, in order to fully 
understand the misinterpretation of law and policy at Abu 
Ghraib, it is important to closely examine President Bush’s 
directive regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions 
in Afghanistan.171  President Bush’s lack of a clear prisoner 
treatment and detention policy in Iraq, in conjunction with his 
failure to provide an extensive explanation for his decision to 
withhold Convention III protections to Taliban and al Qaeda 
detainees,172 contributed to Abu Ghraib military personnel 
utilizing unlawful interrogation and detention techniques.173 
  
 168 MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14 (arguing that “senior military intelligence 
(MI) officers had directed or encouraged the MP guards to ‘set favourable conditions’ 
for interrogation by torturing and breaking down prisoners before questioning . . . . 
That this system derived from the highest level [has been] confirmed . . . .”).  See also 
Timothy L. Burger, et al., The Scandal’s Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004, at 31 
(“The MPs told investigators they [committed the abuses] because officers in the 
military-intelligence unit . . . told them to ‘loosen up’ men for interrogation.”). 
 169 The Schlesinger Report indicates that “none of the senior leadership or 
command [in Iraq] considered any possibility other than that the Geneva Conventions 
applied.”  SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 82.  Nonetheless, “[t]he message in 
the field, or the assumptions made in the field, at times lost sight of this underpinning.  
[Military] [p]ersonnel familiar with the law of determinations for [Afghanistan] tended 
to factor those determinations into their decision-making for military actions in Iraq.”  
Id.  Thus, it can be argued that although some senior military personnel understood 
that the Geneva Conventions applied to military campaigns unless the President 
directed otherwise, not all lower-level military officials were privy to this “assumption.”  
The Taguba Report further supports this argument by finding that supervisors from 
the 800th Military Police Brigade “[n]ever attempted to remind . . . [s]oldiers of the 
requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee treatment or took any 
steps to ensure that such abuse was not repeated.”  TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 
20. 
 170 Paust, supra note 20, at 849.  While some senior military personnel 
understood that the Geneva Conventions applied to the War in Iraq, President Bush’s 
memoranda as well as additional documents issued by the Department of Justice led 
them to believe that protections could be suspended with regard to certain detainees.  
Id. 
 171 See generally Bush Memorandum, supra note 69. 
 172 Id.  
 173 SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 14 (“[T]he changes in DoD 
interrogation policies between December 2, 2002 and April 16, 2003 [with regard to the 
War in Afghanistan] were an element contributing to uncertainties in the [Iraq] field 
as to which techniques were authorized . . . .  Policies approved for use on al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees, who were not afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions, 
now applied to [Abu Ghraib] detainees who did fall under the Geneva Convention[s].”).  
As of yet, the Bush administration fails to acknowledge that it did not establish a clear 
Geneva Convention policy in Iraq.  In fact, Condoleeza Rice argued that “[t]he 
problem . . . was not the President’s policies, which explicitly ruled out [detainee] 
abuse, but the ‘implementation of policy.  There’s obvious confusion in the 
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In the February 7 memorandum, President Bush 
accepted the Department of Justice’s legal conclusion that 
Convention III “[did] not apply to either al Qaeda or Taliban 
detainees, because . . . the relevant conflicts are international 
in scope and common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict 
not of an international character.’”174  Although President Bush 
did not specify which Department of Justice documents formed 
the basis for this conclusion, it is likely that he was referring to 
a January 22, 2002 memorandum written by Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee.175  In the Bybee memorandum, 
the Department of Justice argued that Article 3 of Convention 
III refers only to civil wars that occur when the government of 
a state engages in conflict with non-international armed 
factions within its territory.176  Based on President Bush’s 
limited analysis of Article 3177 and his reliance on the 
Department of Justice’s legal reports, Convention III would not 
apply to the crisis in Iraq.  American and British forces were 
sent to Iraq in March 2003 to locate and disarm weapons of 
mass destruction and to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s 
government.178  The conflict was thus international from the 
beginning and therefore outside the scope of Convention III’s 
Article 3. 
With regard to the conflict in Afghanistan, President 
Bush also held that Taliban detainees are unlawful combatants 
and, therefore, should not receive protections under Convention 
  
military’ . . . not in the White House . . . but inside the military.”  HERSCH, supra note 
19, at 71. 
 174 Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2.  Article 3 refers to a “case of 
armed conflict not of an international character” that “occur[s] in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties.”  See Convention III, supra note 42, at art. 3. 
 175 Immediately preceding the issuance of President Bush’s February 7, 2002 
directive, Bybee submitted two memoranda to the White House and Department of 
Justice.  See generally Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72; Memorandum from 
Assistant Att’y Gen. Jay S. Bybee to White House Counsel Alberto R. Gonzales (Feb. 7, 
2002), http://www.news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/torture/bybee20702mem.html (follow “Feb 
7, 2002 - Department of Justice memo” hyperlink).  However, only Bybee’s January 22, 
2002 memoranda addressed Article 3 of Convention III.  See Bybee Memorandum 
1/22/2002, supra note 72, at 5-6.  
 176 See Bybee Memorandum 1/22/02, supra note 72, at 6.  This legal conclusion 
is largely based on a commentary issued in 1987.  See COMMENTARY ON THE 
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 
1949 ¶ 4339 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
 177 President Bush did not explain the Department of Justice’s Article 3 legal 
conclusions.  Rather, he merely accepted them at face value.  See Bush Memorandum, 
supra note 69, at 2. 
 178 See Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Security website, 
www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraqi_freedom.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004). 
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III.179  Convention III provides that an individual captured 
during an armed conflict must ultimately be labeled a POW,180 
an innocent, or an unprivileged belligerent.181  Unprivileged 
belligerents, such as terrorist groups, are individuals who do 
not qualify for POW status, and therefore are denied all 
Convention III protections.182  While unlawful combatants are 
not mentioned anywhere in Convention III,183 individuals who 
“act[] as . . . associate[s] of a terrorist organization” and who 
are not entitled to POW status are typically regarded as 
such.184  Thus, it can be argued that unprivileged belligerents, 
including terrorists, are unlawful combatants.185  Nonetheless, 
the current policy on unlawful combatants remains both “vague 
and lacking.”186  The terms “unlawful combatant” and “enemy 
  
 179 See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2. 
 180 POW status 
is conferred on individuals who are ‘[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party 
to the conflicts’ as well as ‘[m]embers of other militias and members of other 
volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance movements, 
belonging to a Party . . . provided that such . . . fulfill[s]’ four specific 
conditions:  
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; 
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance;  
(c) That of carrying arms openly; and 
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war. 
Jeffrey F. Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of 
Torture or Similar Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 KY. L.J. 849, 869 (2004) 
(quoting, in part, Convention III, supra note 42, art. 4A).  See also Chlopak, supra note 
33, at 6-7.  
 181 Scheck, supra note 59. 
 182 See id.  
 183 Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 450.  
 184 Addicott, supra note 180, at 871 (quoting Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 
233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d on reh’g sub nom. Padilla ex rel. 
Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 
sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 542 
U.S. 426 (2004)).  See also supra note 180 and accompanying text for POW status 
criteria.  In his memorandum, President Bush failed to explain what characteristics 
define an unlawful combatant.  Instead, he briefly argued how, in light of the new war 
against terrorism, the United States should rethink the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions to “groups with broad, international reach [that] commit horrific acts 
against innocent civilians . . . .”  Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2.  Thus, the 
memorandum suggests that terrorists are unlawful combatants. 
 185 See Chlopak, supra note 33, at 7 (“‘Unlawful combatants,’ often referred to 
as ‘unprivileged combatants’ [or belligerents] are those fighters who are not entitled to 
the privileges of POW status.”).  
 186 See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 81.  See also Chlopak, supra 
note 33, at 7 (“The U.S. government’s classification of . . . detainees as ‘unlawful 
combatants’ has generated confusion and controversy.”).   
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combatant” are frequently used interchangeably.187  Although 
case precedent suggests that both of these designations mean 
the same thing, the government and the Supreme Court have 
not defined either of them.188  The Bush administration did 
state that enemy combatants are individuals who 
“‘support[] . . . and engag[e] in . . . armed conflict against the 
United States’”189 and who commit or plan to commit mass 
murder.190  However, a list of criteria used to classify 
individuals as enemy combatants or unlawful combatants does 
not appear to exist. 
Because the Executive Branch characterized all 
individuals who do not qualify for POW status, including 
terrorists, as unlawful combatants,191 Convention III would not 
protect many Abu Ghraib detainees.  In addition to searching 
for weapons of mass destruction and ending Saddam Hussein’s 
regime, Operation Iraqi Freedom military objectives also 
included dispelling terrorists from the country and gathering 
intelligence information regarding terrorist networks.192  
President Bush subsequently affirmed these objectives by 
publicly referring to some Iraqis as terrorists.193  If the threat of 
terrorism served as one of the Government’s primary rationales 
in denying Taliban detainees protection under Convention 
III,194 then it is only logical to conclude that military personnel 
might assume that Iraqi detainees charged with offenses 
  
 187 See Addicott, supra note 180, at 871 (quoting Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 
593).  
 188 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (“There is some debate as 
to the proper scope of th[e] term [‘enemy combatant’], and the Government has never 
provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as 
such.”). 
 189 Id. at 516 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 3). 
 190 Edward Greer, “We Don’t Torture People in America”: Coercive 
Interrogation in the Global Village, 26(3) NEW POL. SCI. 371, 382-83 (Sept. 2004) 
(quoting President Bush in Mike Allen & Susan Schmidt, Bush Defends Secret 
Tribunals for Terrorism Suspects, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2001, at A28).  
 191 See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.  
 192 See Operation Iraqi Freedom, Global Security Website, supra note 178.  
 193 See Transcript: President Bush Holds Post-G-8 Summit News Conference 
(June 10, 2004), at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32143-2004June10.html 
(President Bush admitting to calling some individuals situated in Iraq “terrorists” and 
“killers.”).  
 194 Paust, supra note 20, at 812 (“A common plan to violate customary and 
treaty-based international law concerning the treatment and interrogation of so-called 
‘terrorist’ and enemy combatant detainees and their supporters captured during the 
U.S. war in Afghanistan emerged within the Bush Administration in 2002.”).  
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against the United States would not be protected under the 
same Convention either.195 
The most confusing aspect of President Bush’s February 
7, 2002 memorandum, however, is his espousal for the humane 
treatment of all detainees, including unlawful combatants.196  
President Bush acknowledged that while certain prisoners may 
not qualify for protection under the Geneva Conventions, they 
should still be treated in a manner consistent with the treaties’ 
principles.197  Only in instances of “military necessity” could the 
torture or inhumane treatment of detainees be authorized.198  
Despite President Bush’s asserted commitment to upholding 
the Conventions’ provisions, the Department of Defense 
approved numerous coercive and arguably inhumane 
interrogation tactics for use in the war against terrorism.199  
Thus, while “[t]he President . . . spoke out against 
torture, . . . his equivocations on the terms of [Convention III] 
suggest that he perceive[d] wiggle room between ideal and 
practice.”200  In essence, the Executive Branch authorized a new 
and unmanageable Geneva Conventions policy that instilled a 
tremendous amount of discretionary power to military 
personnel.  In an effort to eradicate terrorism, President Bush 
created an outlet for unrestrained abuse that ultimately 
resurfaced at the Abu Ghraib prison one year later.201 
The inclusion of the “military necessity” clause in 
President Bush’s directive served as an exception that 
“swallow[ed] the rule.”202  According to government officials, 
military necessity suspends the application of Geneva 
Convention principles when “force protection,” or conduct 
necessary to protect U.S. troops, is required.203  This definition 
of the exception appears to be mischaracterized.  Government 
  
 195 Iraqi prisoners charged with offenses against their countrymen were under 
the supervision of Iraqi soldiers.  From this fact, it can be inferred that those detainees 
under the supervision of US military personnel in Tiers 1A and 1B were charged with 
offenses against the United States.  See SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 7, at 74. 
 196 See Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. 
 199 See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  
 200 Mark Bowden, Lessons of Abu Ghraib, THE ATLANTIC, July 2004, at 40. 
 201 See supra notes 25, 70 and 125 and accompanying text.  
 202 See Press Briefing, supra note 67.  Edward Greer argues that “[w]hat 
constitutes military necessity under this scheme is merely the unilateral decision of the 
Executive itself – a far cry from the specific legal constraints set forth in the 
Conventions.”  Greer, supra note 190, at 379. 
 203 See Press Briefing, supra note 67. 
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interest in preventing another September 11-type attack 
against the United States prompted the White House and the 
Department of Justice to find valid reasons to suspend 
Convention III protections to Taliban and al Qaeda 
detainees.204  Although President Bush encouraged detainees to 
be treated in a manner consistent with the Geneva 
Conventions, he acknowledged an overwhelming need to 
provide military personnel with the means to successfully 
procure information from suspected terrorists regarding 
possible future attacks.205  The military necessity clause 
achieved this purpose by serving as a license to deviate from 
Convention III principles when the lives of innocent American 
civilians, not just U.S. troops, might be at stake.  Thus, by 
discretely incorporating the necessity exception into the 
memorandum, President Bush arguably strived to accomplish 
two dichotomous tasks: to provide the United States military 
with the flexibility to conduct coercive interrogations abroad206 
and to maintain an honorable reputation within the 
international humanitarian rights community.207 
  
 204 See Gonzales Memorandum, supra note 79. 
[T]he war against terrorism is a new kind of war.  It is not the traditional 
clash between nations adhering to the laws of war that formed the backdrop 
for [Convention III].  The nature of the new war places a high premium on 
other factors, such as the ability to quickly obtain information from captured 
terrorists and their sponsors in order to avoid further atrocities against 
American civilians, and the need to try terrorists for war crimes such as 
wantonly killing civilians. 
Id.  See also Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 1. 
[T]he war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups 
with broad, international reach commit horrific acts against innocent 
civilians, sometimes with the direct support of states.  Our Nation recognizes 
that this new paradigm – ushered in not by us, but by terrorists – requires 
new thinking in the law of war . . . . 
Id.; Greer, supra note 190, at 372. 
 205 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
 206 Human Rights Standards, supra note 40, at 275 (“The purposes of this 
interpretation [of the Geneva Conventions with regard to the War in Afghanistan] were 
to preserve maximum flexibility with the least restraint by international law and to 
immunize government officials from prosecution under the War Crimes Act . . . .”); 
Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 453 (“Concerned with the need to acquire as much 
‘actionable intelligence’ as possible, by whatever means, the [Bush] Administration 
adopted a strategy to permit something close to unfettered power in dealing with 
terrorist suspects.”). 
 207 See Richard B. Bilder & Detlev F. Vagts, Speaking Law to Power: Lawyers 
and Torture, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 695 (2004) (finding that “[a] nation’s reputation for 
decency and respect for law is a vital national asset that can strongly affect its 
influence and leadership.”).   
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The effect of President Bush’s military necessity 
exception in conjunction with his support for the humane 
treatment of all detainees created vast confusion at the Abu 
Ghraib detention facility.208  While it might be customary for 
military officials to assume that the Geneva Conventions apply 
to all international conflicts unless otherwise informed,209 
President Bush apparently complicated this issue.  The 
February 7, 2002 memorandum drew a distinction between 
behaving in a manner consistent with Convention III principles 
and strictly abiding by these principles.  In light of this 
development in military policy, the President’s request that 
military personnel in Iraq treat their detainees humanely could 
no longer be viewed as a direct order to abide by the Geneva 
Conventions. 
b. Difficulty Applying Convention III Principles: 
Inadequate Training and the Unlawful 
Migration of Interrogation Methods 
Assuming that Abu Ghraib military personnel 
understood that the Geneva Conventions applied to Iraq, 
inadequate training and the migration of interrogation 
methods from Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay contributed 
to the treaty’s failed application.210  The Jones-Fay Report 
indicates that “[d]espite the emphasis on the Geneva 
Conventions, it is clear from the results at Abu Ghraib . . . that 
Soldiers on the ground are confused about how they apply the 
Geneva Conventions . . . .”211  To demonstrate this fact, the 
report argues that Military Police and Military Intelligence 
personnel did not receive training on interrogation techniques 
such as sleep adjustment, isolation, segregation, environmental 
adjustment, dietary manipulation, the use of military dogs, and 
the removal of clothing.212  Furthermore, upon their arrival into 
Iraq, U.S. soldiers received a mere thirty-six minutes of general 
human rights training at the Joint Interrogation & Debriefing 
  
 208 See supra notes 25, 70 and 125 and accompanying text.  
 209 Press Briefing, supra note 67 (White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales 
arguing that “soldiers are trained from day one in their service to apply [the] Geneva 
[Conventions] . . . .  [T]hat’s . . . the default position . . . that Geneva is going to apply.”).   
 210 See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20, 22, 26, 43-45; SCHLESINGER 
REPORT, supra note 7, at 14, 44; JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 14-16 (Part I); 
JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19, 114 (Part II). 
 211 See JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 19 (Part II).   
 212 Id.  
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Center (JIDC).213  While insufficient training undoubtedly 
increased the frequency and severity of the abuses, none of the 
reports acknowledge the more fundamental problem that the 
implementation of the aforementioned interrogation techniques 
arguably violated Convention III principles.214  Accordingly, in 
addition to improper training, abuses occurred at Abu Ghraib 
because military personnel did not understand the basic 
principles of Convention III, including what constitutes 
“outrages upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and 
degrading treatment.”215  Without a comprehensive knowledge 
of the treaty’s provisions, Abu Ghraib military personnel 
became more likely to commit unauthorized abuses.216 
The migration of interrogation techniques from 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay to Abu Ghraib also 
contributed to military personnel’s confusion regarding the 
breadth and content of Convention III principles.  In 
September 2003, Major General Geoffrey D. Miller, 
Commander at Guantanamo Bay, conducted a review of the 
interrogation methods employed in Iraq.217  In his report, Miller 
concluded that “[i]t is essential that the guard force be actively 
engaged in setting the conditions for successful exploitation of 
the internees,” adding that the regime at Abu Ghraib would 
help create a “synergy between [Military Police] and [Military 
Intelligence] resources . . . .”218  Accordingly, Miller submitted 
  
 213 Steven H. Miles, Abu Ghraib: Its Legacy for Military Medicine, 364 LANCET 
725, 726 (Aug. 21, 2004).  Major General Taguba, however, found that 372nd Military 
Police Batallion and the 372nd Military Police Company received no training on 
detention procedures and that very little training was provided to Military Police 
personnel regarding Convention III.  See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20.  
 214 Gottlieb, supra note 65, at 455. 
[Although] Secretary Rumsfeld may not have specifically authorized the use 
of the worst tortures . . . there should be no mistaking of how short the 
distance was between practices that the reservists were authorized to engage 
in or thought they were authorized to engage in and the tortures and 
humiliations that were in fact committed.  The administration authorized the 
use of dogs, the administration authorized the stripping naked of prisoners, 
the administration authorized exploiting Islamic concerns for modesty, the 
administration authorized the causing of physical pain.  In Iraq, these 
procedures were ultimately used against a population that America claimed 
to be liberating. 
Id. 
 215 See Convention III, supra note 42, at art. 3.  See also supra note 15 and 
accompanying text.  
 216 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.   
 217 MacMaster, supra note 66, at 14. 
 218 GEOFFREY MILLER, ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM 
INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 6 (2003), available at 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB140/a20.pdf. 
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recommendations to Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, the 
senior military commander in Iraq, regarding the possible 
implementation of interrogation techniques utilized in 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.219  Although conflicting 
reports exist as to whether Miller warned Sanchez that the 
suggested interrogation tactics violated Convention III, 
Sanchez accepted his recommendations and distributed a 
memo to Abu Ghraib Military Intelligence officers that 
ultimately formed the basis for a set of coercive interrogation 
guidelines.220   
In addition to Sanchez’s memorandum, unlawful 
questioning also became institutionalized through “word of 
mouth” techniques passed to Abu Ghraib military personnel 
from assistant teams in Guantanamo Bay.221  What little 
understanding of the Geneva Conventions Abu Ghraib soldiers 
possessed after their JIDC training diminished considerably 
following the migration of interrogation techniques from 
Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.  The methods advanced by 
Miller and other military personnel stationed in Afghanistan 
and Cuba arguably violated Convention III principles.222  At the 
very least, introducing these techniques to soldiers stationed in 
Iraq created a misimpression as to what interrogation 
techniques satisfied Convention III’s humanitarian 
requirements. 
The Jones-Fay Report suggests that “interrogation is an 
art . . . and knowing the limits of authority is crucial.”223  Abu 
Ghraib military personnel did not understand how to comply 
with Convention III principles, in large part, because of 
President Bush’s February 7, 2002 directive.224  America’s “war 
on terror” provided the Bush Administration with a 
justification to create an ambiguous Geneva Conventions 
  
 219 Mark Mazzetti, et al., Inside the Iraq Prison Scandal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP ONLINE., May 24, 2004, at ¶¶ 2-3, 9, 14, at http://www.usnews.com/ 
usnews/news/articles/040524/24leadall_5.htm. 
 220 Paust, supra note 20, at 847-48.  The guidelines allowed for “sleep 
deprivation, forcing prisoners into ‘stress’ positions for up to 45 minutes, and 
threatening them with guard dogs.”  Mazzetti, supra note 219, at ¶ 9. 
 221 JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).   
 222 See Working Group Report supra note 104, at 2A-2B (stating that the 
interrogation techniques authorized by Secretary Rumsfeld raised “major issue[s] in 
[the] area of consideration that cannot be eliminated” with regard to international 
treaties and United States domestic laws).  See also supra note 20 and accompanying 
text.  
 223 JONES-FAY REPORT, supra note 8, at 15 (Part I).  
 224 See supra notes 25 and 125 and accompanying text.  
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policy.225  The directive’s “military necessity” exception enabled 
military personnel to circumvent the Geneva Conventions 
when national security might be at issue.226  By establishing an 
exception to the Geneva Conventions, the Bush Administration 
effectively ignored international humanitarian rights 
standards and formed an outlet for detainee abuse.227  With 
regard to the War in Iraq, President Bush never formally 
indicated that the Geneva Conventions did, in fact, apply.228  
And even if Abu Ghraib military personnel correctly assumed 
that detainees qualified for full protection under Convention 
III, it still remained unclear whether the “military necessity” 
exception carried over from Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.  
Accordingly, Abu Ghraib military personnel followed their 
predecessors’ example and utilized interrogation methods 
unlawful under the Geneva Conventions.229 
After reviewing the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the Abu Ghraib prison atrocity, it becomes clear 
that the Bush Administration’s failure to implement a clear 
Convention III policy in Iraq ignited a chain of events that led 
to the abuse of numerous detainees.230  Accordingly, a strategy 
must be devised to prevent additional wartime human rights 
violations.  Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill attempts to 
achieve this goal by proposing a series of deterrent measures, 
designed to address individualized instances of abuse.231  A 
more effective bill, however, would focus on remedying the 
underlying policy problems that initially facilitated the 
prisoner abuse.  
  
 225 Greer, supra note 190, at 372 (“Since September 11, 2001 . . . torture has 
been the practice and de facto policy of the Bush administration . . . as a core means of 
conducting the so-called ‘war on terror.’”).  “It’s not that the United States has any 
particular interest in egregious human rights violations.  It’s just that it’s a natural 
corollary to what it is interested in, and to how you achieve goals like that.”  NOAM 
CHOMSKY, POWER AND TERROR:  POST-9/11 TALKS AND INTERVIEWS 48 (2003). 
 226 See supra notes 202-07 and accompanying text. 
 227 The February 7, 2002 memorandum “is potentially one of the broadest 
putative excuses for violations of Geneva law.”  Paust, supra note 20, at 828.  
MacMaster, supra note 66, at 4 (stating that “international law makes it clear that 
protection from cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment by the state is not negotiable 
or open to derogation.”). 
 228 See supra notes 22 and 24 and accompanying text.  
 229 See supra notes 217-220 and accompanying text.  
 230 Equally troubling, the Bush Administration has not yet issued a new order 
directing compliance with the Geneva Conventions in Iraq.  The order that “merely 
Geneva ‘principles’ should be applied and then only if ‘appropriate’ and if ‘consistent 
with military necessity’” still governs.  Paust, supra note 20, at 854.   
 231 See generally Interrogation Bill, surpa note 1. 
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO THE ABU GHRAIB PRISON 
ABUSES: ERADICATE MISINTERPRETATIONS OF LAW AND 
POLICY WITHIN THE MILITARY 
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill serves as a 
strong preliminary response to a complicated controversy.  
Section One directs the President to order the videotaping of 
interrogations and “other pertinent interactions” of detainees 
in the custody of the United States armed forces as well as 
intelligence operatives and contractors of the United States.232  
Section Two requires the President to “take such actions as are 
necessary” to ensure that human rights organizations are 
granted “unfettered access” to detainees in the custody of the 
United States.233  Finally, Section Three requires that the 
Judge Advocate General develop guidelines that are 
“sufficiently expansive to prevent any abuse of detainees” that 
violates “law binding on the United States, including 
[international] treaties.”234 
In general, the Interrogation Bill’s provisions are 
designed to prevent future abuses through the use of effective 
scare tactics.  By requiring the videotaping of interrogations 
and “other pertinent actions”235 between a detainee and United 
States military personnel, it is expected that soldiers will 
refrain from committing inhumane acts for fear of getting 
caught.  The same rationale applies with regard to granting the 
United Nations and other human rights organizations 
unfettered access to all detention facilities.236  Unannounced 
and spontaneous detention facility visits by human rights 
organizations increases the probability that more human rights 
abuses will be discovered, and as a consequence, disobedient 
military personnel will be punished.   
The attractiveness of the bill’s simple logic, however, 
does not outweigh its many defects.  For example, the 
Interrogation Bill’s videotape and unfettered access 
requirements do not address the problem that many Abu 
Ghraib military did not understand the applicability of 
Convention III to the crisis in Iraq, including its breadth and 
  
 232 Id. § 1.  
 233 Id. § 2.  
 234 Id. § 3.  
 235 Id. § 1. 
 236 Id. § 2.  
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scope.237  These problems emanated from the White House’s 
failure to establish a coherent Geneva Conventions policy 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom.238  The Executive Branch’s 
ambiguity in this respect led to the military’s reliance on 
detention operations and interrogation techniques utilized 
during the War in Afghanistan.239  The success of the bill’s 
videotape and unfettered access requirements largely depends 
upon military personnel’s understanding of what acts fail to 
comply with the Geneva Conventions.  Although some U.S. 
soldiers stationed in Iraq knew that their behavior violated the 
Geneva Conventions,240 others employed coercive interrogation 
tactics because they believed the Executive Branch had 
sanctioned them.241  As written, the Interrogation Bill only 
addresses the former group of military personnel.  Its 
deterrence measures are contingent upon soldiers’ awareness 
of the treaty’s applicability.  And because one cannot be 
deterred from engaging in acts that he or she does not know 
violate Convention III, the Interrogation Bill fails to achieve its 
designated purpose. 
Thus, in order to prevent another Abu Ghraib atrocity, 
Congress must focus on remedying the fundamental policy and 
interpretation of law errors that existed at the detention 
facility.  Accordingly, a more effective bill proposal would direct 
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to clearly indicate to 
military personnel at the onset of every international conflict to 
what extent detainees should be treated in accordance with the 
Geneva Conventions.242  In order to accomplish this task, the 
  
 237 See supra Part IV. 
 238 See supra Part IV.B.ii.a.  
 239 See supra Part IV.B.ii.a-b. 
 240 See supra Part IV.B.i.  
 241 See supra Part IV.B.ii.a-b. 
 242 Any congressional attempt to dictate military policy will always raise 
Separation of Power concerns.  As Commander-in-Chief, the President enjoys the broad 
authority to exclusively control all war operations.  See supra notes 104-07 and 
accompanying text.  See also Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. 73, 87 (1874) (“the President 
alone . . . is constitutionally invested with the entire charge of hostile operations.”).  
However, some scholars have contended that the “power to regulate the treatment of 
wartime detainees is shared between the legislative and executive branches.”  Jinks & 
Sloss, supra note 18, at 172.  When “the United States ratifies a treaty that constrains 
the President’s operational discretion [i.e., Convention III], that treaty ratification 
empowers Congress to regulate in areas where it could not otherwise regulate.”  Id. at 
176.  Specifically, under the Constitution’s Define and Punish and Necessary and 
Proper Clauses, Congress possesses the power to regulate “matters governed by [a] 
treaty, even if those matters would otherwise be subject to the President’s exclusive 
power.”  Id. at 179.  Moreover, the Government and Regulation Clause also grants 
Congress “the power to prescribe rules for the treatment of wartime detainees . . . .”  Id. 
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bill must require the President to: (1) assess whether the 
warring state qualifies as a “High Contracting Party” under 
Article 4 of Convention III;243 (2) assess whether the armed 
conflict is “not of an international character occurring in the 
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” under Article 
3 of Convention III;244 (3) define “unlawful combatant” and 
assess whether the enemy force should not receive protection 
under Convention III because it qualifies as such; and (4) 
obtain congressional approval before attempting to violate any 
or all Convention III articles.245   
The incorporation of the aforementioned provisions into 
the Interrogation Bill address the underlying policy problems 
that gave rise to the Abu Ghraib prison abuses.  Sections One 
and Two prevent the President from assuming that military 
personnel understand that Convention III always applies to 
instances of armed conflict unless otherwise informed.  This 
task is accomplished by requiring the President to discern the 
applicability of Convention III to military campaigns using the 
treaty’s own language.  In effect, a formal analysis process will 
compel the President to establish a clear Convention III policy, 
thus reducing the possibility of future confusion among low-
level military personnel stationed abroad. 
Section Three responds to the ambiguity arising from 
President Bush’s use of the term “unlawful combatant” in his 
February 7, 2002 directive.246  In order to prevent this term 
from being employed as a broad-based exception to the Geneva 
Conventions, a list of criteria defining unlawful or enemy 
combatant must be created.  After formulating a definition, 
President Bush may use it as an additional tool to assist him in 
delineating a clear Geneva Conventions policy at the onset of 
every military campaign.  Section Three, however, cannot be 
read in a vacuum.  If the President determines that certain 
detainees are unlawful combatants, he cannot deny protection 
  
at 175.  Under this clause, it can be argued that “the vast majority of the provisions 
embodied in the Geneva Conventions address matters that are well within the scope of 
Congress’s . . . [p]ower.”  Id. at 175.  Because this Note’s proposed modifications deal 
exclusively with the President’s compliance with Convention III, it can be argued that 
they do not exceed the scope of legislative supervision and do not infringe upon the 
Executive Branch’s Article II powers.  
 243 See Convention III, supra note 42, art. 4. 
 244 Id. art. 3. 
 245 See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 106. 
 246 Bush Memorandum, supra note 69, at 2. 
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under the Geneva Conventions without Congress’ express 
approval as articulated in Section Four.247 
Section Four refutes the Bush Administration’s position 
that the President can unilaterally violate248 Convention III 
provisions to protect national security.249  Even if a presidential 
action can be justified on “national security grounds” (e.g., 
denying Geneva Conventions protections to suspected enemy 
combatants for the purposes of procuring important 
intelligence information), the action “may [still] impose 
significant constraints on personal liberty.”250  In order to 
prevent discretionary abuse and “‘conciliate the confidence of 
the [American] people,’”251 Congress must be able to prescribe 
guidelines for the treatment of wartime detainees so long as 
they do not interfere with the President’s control over 
battlefield operations.252  Accordingly, Executive branch 
directives regarding the possible violation of Convention III 
protections are subject to legislative review.253  This rule does 
not undermine the Executive Branch’s Commander-in-Chief 
Power with regard to law-of-war treaties.  On the contrary, the 
President may still suspend and terminate treaties so long as 
such actions are made in accordance with the treaties’ terms.254   
In effect, Section Four strengthens the government’s 
commitment to upholding humanitarian rights standards by 
requiring the Executive Branch to gain congressional 
authorization before breaching any of the United States’ treaty 
obligations.  It places a check on the President’s ability to 
  
 247 Some scholars contend that even if a prisoner is deemed an unlawful 
combatant, thereby rendering Convention III inapplicable, the prisoner should still be 
afforded protection under Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
in Time of War.  Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 101.  Accordingly, to deprive the 
prisoner any form of protection would be a violation of the treaty, which is 
impermissible without congressional approval.  Id. at 102, 146-47. 
 248 It is important to note that there is a difference between “treaty 
termination” and “treaty suspension” or “violation.”  International law principles 
enable “parties to a treaty [to] jointly terminate a treaty either by consent of all the 
parties or by concluding a later treaty.  A state may unilaterally terminate or suspend 
the operation of a treaty in response to a material breach by another party.”  Id. at 154.  
Furthermore, a state may also “invoke ‘the impossibility of performing a treaty,’ or ‘[a] 
fundamental change of circumstances’ as a ground for terminating . . . the operation of 
a treaty.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 249 Jinks & Sloss, supra note 18, at 102, 146-47. 
 250 Id. at 153. 
 251 Id. at 174 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)). 
 252 See id. at 175. 
 253 See id. at 164, 172-73. 
 254 See id. at 163. 
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violate Convention III protections when Congress questions his 
reasons for wanting to do so.  In light of President Bush’s 
suspension of Convention III protections to al Qaeda and 
Taliban detainees and its repercussions in Iraq, this Section 
serves to prevent detainee abuses and to rehabilitate the 
government’s reputation within the international human rights 
community. 
The incorporation of the aforementioned provisions into 
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill provides a 
comprehensive response to the Abu Ghraib prison abuses.  
Representative Holt proposes deterrent measures that can only 
prevent additional abuses if military personnel understand the 
applicability of the Geneva Conventions as well as the breadth 
and scope of the treaty’s protections.255  The four additional 
provisions introduced and analyzed in this Note, however, 
address the fundamental policy problems that originated in the 
Executive Branch during the War in Afghanistan and that 
existed during Operation Iraqi Freedom as well.  Specifically, 
Sections One, Two, and Three ensure that soldiers will no 
longer be confused about the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions during military campaigns in light of President 
Bush’s ambiguous February 7, 2002 directive.  Section Four, on 
the other hand, prevents the President from violating the 
Geneva Conventions without congressional authorization.  
Compliance with Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill 
might result in the apprehension of a handful of transgressors.  
Adherence to this Note’s proposals, however, ensures that the 
number of broad-based policy problems confronting military 
personnel at Abu Ghraib and other prison facilities will be 
minimized. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Confusion regarding the applicability of Convention III 
at the Abu Ghraib prison can largely be attributed to the 
development of expansive military policies after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks.  What began as an attempt by the 
Bush Administration to protect national security through the 
procurement of vital intelligence information during the 
Afghanistan conflict became a means to commit unsanctioned 
abuses in Iraq.  By not clearly limiting his February 7, 2002 
directive to the War in Afghanistan, President Bush left open 
  
 255 See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text. 
984 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2 
for interpretation whether many Iraqi detainees should not be 
afforded Convention III protections.  Moreover, those military 
personnel that did understand Convention III’s applicability in 
Iraq undoubtedly misinterpreted the treaty’s provisions after 
becoming privy to the coercive interrogation methods utilized 
in both Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay.   
In light of these fundamental problems, Congress must 
introduce a bill that not only seeks to apprehend and punish 
transgressors, but that prevents the Executive Branch from 
creating ambiguous detainee treatment policies.  
Representative Holt’s Interrogation Bill serves as a solid 
foundation.  The bill’s videotape and unfettered access 
requirements arguably will prevent military personnel who 
understand Convention III’s applicability and protections from 
committing unauthorized abuses.  Nonetheless, because a 
number of U.S. soldiers stationed in Iraq either did not 
understand Convention III’s applicability or did not 
understand the breadth and scope of the treaty’s protections, 
additional provisions are needed to prevent another Abu 
Ghraib atrocity.  Accordingly, this Note’s proposed 
modifications require the Executive Branch to delineate clear 
Convention III guidelines at the onset of every military 
campaign and limit its ability to violate the treaty’s articles.  
The incorporation of such provisions will hopefully reduce the 
number and magnitude of future detainee abuses and assist in 
the rebuilding of our government’s reputation within the 
international humanitarian rights community.  Moreover, such 
a law should still be passed even if it cannot take effect until 
after U.S. troops pull out of Iraq.  In light of the government’s 
“war on terror,” it is conceivable that other countries might be 
invaded in the near future.  Congress must not lose sight of 
this fact and continue to work towards preventing prisoner 
abuses, not just in Iraq, but in all subsequent military 
campaigns. 
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